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1. Introduction
Thank you for the invitation to talk about ethics and morality in the Vienna Circle in this
workshop about the future of mathematical philosophy. For several reasons, that is not to be
taken for granted. The first pertains to me as a philosopher: I am not a mathematical
philosopher. A second reason is that mathematical philosophy is not closely associated with
morality or ethics. Moreover, the Vienna Circle itself is not closely associated with morality
or ethics, either. However, I hope that these reservations will vanish or at least be diminished
by the end of my talk. In keeping with the purpose of this workshop, I aim to provide some
input from the past by giving a selective overview and discussing with you whether this is of
more than antiquarian interest.
As you know, from the Vienna Circle and other European philosophical groups
(especially the Berlin Group) emerged a philosophical movement that now is known as
Logical Empiricism, Logical Positivism or Neopositivism. The characterization as well as the
relationship of this movement to ethics and morality are not considered difficult without
reason. Nevertheless, the questions that arose in this context are worth reconsidering. This
may be surprising to someone who still holds at least one of the two main prejudices
concerning the Vienna Circle that I will concentrate on. If we take the term “morality” to refer
to a certain common practice of daily life you are all sufficiently familiar with and the term
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following way.
(1) Most members of the Vienna Circle as human beings and citizens were not
interested in morality.
(2) As far as some members regarded morality in a philosophical way, that is,
practiced ethics, they supported the standard view of logical empiricist ethics.
I will explain what I mean by “the standard view of logical empiricist ethics” at due time. I
ask you for some patience.
The important issue for now is that these two theses constitute the prevailing view on
the role and conception of ethics and morality in the Vienna Circle. In my monograph on this
topic (Siegetsleitner 2014a), I disprove this view and reject it as too undifferentiated.
Although the monograph treats the ethical main topics and positions as those developed in the
respective personal and cultural contexts, I cannot address these questions today. Instead, in
the first part of my talk, I will present central reasons for my rejection of the prevailing view.
In the last part, I put forth for discussion some theses about why these findings are relevant
for mathematical philosophy, or rather, for mathematical philosophers.
2. Scientific Humanism
As far as the first thesis of the prevailing view is concerned, it is of great interest that most
members of the Vienna Circle not only were interested in morality but that the core members
of the circle even shared an enlightened and humanistic version of morality. This further
motivated them to a certain respective practical engagement. They all endorsed what Carnap
called “scientific humanism” in his “Intellectual Autobiography” published in 1963 (Carnap
1963a). By the way, Feigl had already used the expression in 1949 (Feigl 1949 [1981, p.
368]).
Scientific humanism is a moral position comprised of the following four principles.
31. Human living conditions and life should be improved.
2. Whatever can be done to improve human living conditions and life is the task of
human beings themselves. (“man has no supernatural protectors or enemies”)
3. Many sufferings can be avoided.
4. Science is one of the most valuable instruments in the improvement of human
living conditions and life (Carnap 1963a, p. 83).
The first principle states the fundamental normative dimension of this moral stance.
The other principles identify whose task this is, what can be achieved and the importance of
science in this endeavour. Carnap writes, “[…] mankind is able to change the conditions of
life in such a way that many of the sufferings of today may be avoided and that the external
and the internal situation of life for the individual, the community, and finally for humanity
will be essentially improved” (Carnap 1963a, p. 83). Scientific humanism considers science
one of the most valuable tools in achieving these aims. Hence, Carnap continues: “[…] all
deliberate action presupposes knowledge of the world, that the scientific method is the best
method of acquiring knowledge and that therefore science must be regarded as one of the
most valuable instruments for the improvement of life” (Carnap 1963a, p. 83). As far as we
know, this moral position was shared by most members of the Vienna Circle, as Carnap stated
in his autobiography.1
This common view can also be found in the program pamphlet of the Verein Ernst
Mach Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle published in the year 1929.
Written by Neurath, Hahn and Carnap, it is also called “the manifesto”. It clearly states:
The attitudes toward questions of life also showed a noteworthy agreement, although
these questions were not in the foreground of themes discussed within the Circle. For
these attitudes are more closely related to the scientific world-conception than it might
at first glance appear from a purely theoretical point of view. For instance, endeavours
1 “A number of my friends in the Vienna Circle probably shared these views in their essential features; but in
detail, naturally, there were important differences” (Carnap 1963a, p. 83).
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mankind, toward a reform of school and education, all show an inner link with the
scientific world-conception; it appears that these endeavours are welcomed and
regarded with sympathy by the members of the Circle, some of whom indeed actively
further them (Neurath/Hahn/Carnap 1929 [1973, p. 305]).
Scientific humanism was closely linked to the scientific world-conception, and most members
of the circle were united in endorsing it. Since scientific humanism is a very general attitude,
it was interpreted and specified in several ways. As far as political engagement was
concerned, Neurath, for example, combined it with a socialist political agenda, Schlick with a
more liberal one.
In addition, the manifesto outlined the historical roots of this moral attitude. It invokes
eudaimonism, liberalism, and utilitarianism. In addition to antimetaphysical research and
interdisciplinarity, the manifesto generally stresses principles of this-worldliness and life-
affinity (Lebensverbundenheit) (Stadler 1985, p. 117). These principles are pronounced in
scientific humanism.
Because science is regarded as of prime importance to this conception of morality and
logic as central to science, even Carnap’s logical work is no retreat from engagement but one
form of relevant practice. The well-known sentences in the last paragraph of the manifesto
hence read:
Of course not every single adherent of the scientific world-conception will be a
fighter. Some, glad of solitude, will lead a withdrawn existence on the icy slopes of
logic; some may even disdain mingling with the masses and regret the "trivialized"
form that these matters inevitably take on spreading. However, their achievements too
will take a place among the historic developments. We witness the spirit of the
scientific world-conception penetrating in growing measure the forms of personal and
public life, in education, upbringing, architecture, and the shaping of economic and
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and life receives it. (Neurath/Hahn/Carnap 1929 [1973, p. 306]).
Let me conclude: Quite contrary to the first thesis of the prevailing view, most members of
the Vienna Circle as human beings and citizens were highly interested in morality, namely in
a certain conception of morality that was called scientific humanism. Its holders are
convinced that it is the task of humanity itself to improve human living conditions and life
and that science is one of the most valuable means to this improvement.
Much of analytic philosophy and supposedly mathematical philosophy still is –
explicitly or implicitly – motivated by this general moral position as a background
assumption. Therefore, some feel they are part of a morally good or even the best movement,
which they see as inherently linked to analytic methods. Not surprisingly, an enemy to these
methods is sometimes regarded as more than a philosophical enemy. However, let us
postpone this for discussion.
3. The Standard View
I will now turn to the standard view of moral philosophy generally ascribed to the Vienna
Circle in the second thesis of the prevailing view. As I have mentioned, this thesis is often
meant as a reproach.
The standard view of logical empiricist moral philosophy is characterized by (1) first,
the acceptance of descriptive empirical research – but this research is not regarded as genuine
moral philosophy – and (2) second, by the rejection of normative and substantial ethics.
Metaethics remains the only legitimate way of doing moral philosophy. In addition, and (3)
third, within metaethics, logical empiricist moral philosophy is characterized by an extreme
form of non-cognitivism.
By "an extreme form of non-cognitivism", I mean the thesis that there is no room for
knowledge and/or rationality in moral matters. For more details, please see my monograph.
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shown in the monograph, Carnap's position is nearest to the standard view. Menger’s,
Neurath’s and Frank’s positions already depart in some respects. Schlick’s, Kraft’s and
Feigl’s views, finally, deviate the most from it. In contrast to the commonly held picture of
ivory tower logicians and metaethicists, some members of the Vienna Circle even practiced
applied ethics. To my own surprise, Schlick even used this very expression, which was
common in the Ethical Movement at the time.
In this respect, a short note about the Ethical Movement and its importance is
adequate. The Ethical Movement was initiated in the last decades of the 19th century. Its aim
was a secular humanist moral life, moral education, and philosophy. In 1890, the movement
launched the International Journal of Ethics, known as Ethics today (see Siegetsleitner
2014b). Carnap and Schlick were members of the Ethical Community in Vienna. They took
an active part in this movement2. The initiator of the Ethical Movement in Austria was the
Viennese philosophy professor Friedrich Jodl. Although he is mentioned in the manifesto, he
is unduly nearly forgotten today. This important relationship between logical empiricists and
the Ethical Movement still deserves closer consideration.
Let me now explain the deviations from the standard view in more detail by looking at
the position of some core members. Due to time limits, I cannot talk about all the members I
have mentioned.
4. Proponents and Deviants
4.1 Carnap (1891–1970)
Because Carnap is the member of the Vienna Circle whose conception of moral philosophy is
closest to the standard view, I will present relevant aspects of his position first. In his well-
known article “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache”
2 Stebbing gave ethical lectures at the Sunday meetings of the South Place Ethical Society (e.g., on 10 December
1939 and 19 April 1942).
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finds nearly all elements of this view. In the English-speaking world, this perspective was
widely spread by Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic (1936) and Carnap’s own Philosophy
and Logical Syntax (1935). The latter contains the published version of three lectures Carnap
gave at the University of London during his first visit to Great Britain in 1934. By the way, it
was Susan Stebbing who invited Carnap to give these lectures (see Siegetsleitner 2015).
Stebbing and Carnap share the humanistic approach as can be seen, for example, through her
conviction that morality does not require otherworldly sanctions or religion (see, e.g., her
“Ethics and Materialism”, 1939). Prior to this position, Carnap was more closely associated
with phenomenological and Neo-Kantian approaches regarding questions of value (see, e.g.,
Mormann 2006 and Siegetsleitner 2014a). The traces of these approaches can be found in
Carnap’s Aufbau (§152). I will not elaborate on this but instead on Carnap’s position during
and after his time as a member of the Vienna Circle.
First, in Carnap’s conception of morality during his Viennese time, the content of
morality is simply determined by individual decisions. This is why Hans Zeisel could report
in his “Erinnerungen an Rudolf Carnap” about an incident in Vienna:
There, students asked Carnap: "Do you really mean that morality is something
everyone has to decide on for himself?”, and he said: "Yes". Hence, they were angry
and said: "That means, if you liked to, you could murder and this would be moral?”,
and he answered: "Yes, in my sense, indeed, but luckily I have no inclination to
murder” (Zeisel 1993, p. 220, transl. by A.S.).
In “Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language”, Carnap expressed his
position that all value statements were merely expressions of a Lebensgefühl, moral ones
included. However, this was not a conclusion reached by logical analysis but a
presupposition. We should take his “in my sense” very seriously.
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vein:
But actually a value statement is nothing else than a command in a misleading
grammatical form. It may have effects upon the actions of men, and these effects may
either be in accordance with our wishes or not; but it is neither true nor false. It does
not assert anything and can neither be proved nor disproved (Carnap 1935, p. 24).
What value statements express, are permanent emotional or volitional dispositions (Carnap
1935, pp. 29 f.).
That the crucial points are taken for granted still holds true for Carnap’s later work in
the logical treatment of value statements. As you might know, in his reply to Kaplan (Carnap
1963b) on value statements Carnap developed a formal language for pure optatives and
introduced the optative-operator “utinam”. Unfortunately, Carnap could not give an answer
either to the question of whether we need such a language for our moral practice or to the
question of whether this is an adequate interpretation of the moral vocabulary used in our
moral practice.
Carnap’s account of individualistic non-cognitivism ultimately turns out to be his
interpretation of value statements right from the beginning. This is not problematic as long as
one is aware of it. Carnap knew about this:
Everyone has the right to determine the interpretation of any statement he makes; and
the reader has to accept the interpretation of the author unless he finds a discrepancy
between the interpretation explicitly stated by the author and that implied in the way in
which the author uses the statement or argues about it (Carnap 1963b, p. 1000).
One has to accept it as a possible interpretation, however, not to adopt it!
Carnap holds an individualistic version of moral epistemic decisionism. According to
this position, individual decisions determine whether a moral statement is right or wrong.
Expressing this view, he could say in 1964 that what is morally good or bad is “the individual
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it” (Carnap 1964 [1993, p. 146]).
On this basic assumption, there was little room for normative or substantial ethics.
Regardless, Carnap did not use it at all, although in his later contribution, there opened up
room for logic and rationality.
4.2 Otto Neurath (1882–1945)
Let me continue with Neurath, although I will be rather brief about his work. Neurath was
convinced that science, and up to a certain extent, philosophy could make a major positive
difference to people’s living conditions and happiness. His philosophical work has an obvious
moral purpose, with scientific humanism as the relevant background. However, although he
was concerned about the miserable living conditions of men and women, he restricted his
academic work to providing tools for the social sciences to describe and finally improve these
circumstances. He developed his famous felicitology using formal and mathematical
economic methods.
In philosophy, Neurath worked against harmful speculations. He saw Stebbing as an
ally when he points out: “It is not only by accident that L. Susan Stebbing wrote on the one
hand a book criticizing highly metaphysical speculations of modern physicists and on the
other hand her Thinking to some Purpose and her Ideals and Illusions” (1941, p. 132). Here
we find again a connection to Stebbing, who was an active member of the Unity of Science
Movement.
Although Neurath was in favour of formal and mathematical methods, their
application had to prove their usefulness to his moral and political enterprise. Therefore, he let
Carnap know in a letter in 1945 a few days before his sudden death: “In our movement I
sometimes have the feeling that some members avoid discussing problems of decision, action
etc and are using analysis as a kind of escape from life. THAT IS NOT MY APPROACH”
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(Neurath to Carnap, 22 September 1945, Vienna Circle Archive, Haarlem (NL), Inv.-No.
223).
It was certainly not the approach of Schlick, either, to whom I turn now.
4.3 Moritz Schlick (1882–1936)
Schlick deviates from the standard view in fundamental respects. I will restrict myself to his
stance on the legitimacy of normative ethics.
Basically, Schlick followed the ideal of a wise man, suggesting a worthwhile way of
life to people. His first book, Lebensweisheit (The Wisdom of Life, published in 1908), already
deals with ethical questions. In 1930, he published Fragen der Ethik (Problems of Ethics,
English translation 1939), which mostly is about moral psychological issues like
psychological hedonism. Nevertheless, and surprisingly, the last chapter proclaims a moral
principle on a eudaimonist basis: “Be ready for happiness!” (1939, p. 187). On the same basis,
his posthumously published work Natur und Kultur (Nature and Culture, 1952) discusses
questions of politics, war, economics, law and technology. It belongs in the category of
applied ethics. In Schlick’s manuscript “Ethik des modernen Lebens. Eine Kritik der
Gegenwärtigen Kultur” from the academic year 1927/28 the term “Angewandte Ethik”
[applied ethics] is used:
Wenn ich also sage, dass wir es in diesen Vorlesungen mit angewandter Philosophie
zu tun haben werden, mit angewandter Ethik, so heisst dies, das [sic!] wir uns zum
Ziel setzen nicht die wissenschaftliche Aufgabe der Erforschung der Prinzipien
menschlichen Handelns, sondern dass wir uns beschäftigen werden mit ihrer
Anwendung auf besondere, konkrete Fälle des menschlichen Daseins. Nicht auf
erdachte, ausgeklügelte Fälle – denn damit blieben wir immer noch in der Sphäre der
Theorie – sondern auf wirkliche Verhältnisse des menschlichen Lebens (Schlick
[Ethik des modernen Lebens], Vienna Circle Archive, Haarlem (NL), Inv.-Nr. 10/A.
18, 2 f.).
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We have to realise that Schlick practiced normative and applied ethics on a eudaimonist basis.
This demonstrates that Schlick believed in the legitimacy of normative ethics, therein
differing from the logical empiricist standard view of moral philosophy.
4.4 Victor Kraft (1880–1975)
The last member whose contribution to ethics I want to discuss is Victor Kraft. In contrast to
many members of the circle, Kraft had not studied physics or mathematics, but rather
philosophy, geography, and history. In 1914, he habilitated in theoretical philosophy. The
topic of his thesis was Weltbegriff und Erkenntnisbegriff, and Jodl was one of his supervisors
(Topitsch 1960, p. III f.).
Kraft remained an independent thinker within the circle. Ernst Topitsch writes about
Kraft’s position in the circle: “[…], he had already reached maturity, both as a man and as a
philosopher, when the group was formed round Moritz Schlick in the 20’s and he had by then
brought to completion important works entirely of his own. […], he was far too independent
to start again as a disciple” (Topitsch 1976, p. xi), Kraft maintained a critical attitude, for
example, towards physicalism and the idea of a unity of science, as Rutte has shown (Rutte
1973, p. 7).
In 1937, Kraft published the first edition of his Grundlagen einer wissenschaftlichen
Wertlehre (Foundations of a Scientific Value Theory) in the series Schriften zur
wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung. The editors were Schlick and Frank. The second, an
essentially revised edition, followed in 1951. This second version was published in English
under the title Foundations for a Scientific Analysis of Value in 1981.
Already in the first edition, Kraft distinguishes between the factual content
(Sachgehalt) and the value character (Wertcharakter) of value concepts used in value
judgements. In Kraft’s account, this value character does not express an individual statement,
but an impersonal (überpersönlich) and general view: “A value judgment means […]: the
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command to a statement to an object, generally and anonymously, not of a certain person for
certain people” (Kraft 1937, p. 164, transl. by A.S.).
According to Kraft, there are pure value concepts like “good” or “bad”. However, in
most concepts, an additional component is present: a factual content. This component
provides the criteria for impersonal judgement. In these cases, Kraft speaks of specialized
value concepts. In his theory, moral concepts always belong to this category. If the criteria for
these impersonal judgements are empirical, depending on the moral approach, there is plenty
of room for rational argument and knowledge. This position is far beyond an extreme non-
cognitivism.
In addition, Kraft made numerous attempts to come up with a rational justification of
why everybody is bound to certain impersonal moral views. In one of these attempts he
regards acting according morality as a necessary condition for reaching aims decreed by
human nature. In another, he refers to basic requirements of culture. Unfortunately, all
attempts are full with flaws. Nonetheless, he kept trying up until old age. Therefore, when one
talks about Kraft’s rational justifications of morality in more detail, one has to state which
attempt is discussed.
To cut this long story short: Based on these findings, it is wrong that the members of
the Vienna Circle generally rejected normative/substantial ethics or endorsed an extreme form
of non-cognitivism.
5. Lessons for Today?
Why is this historical retrospective important for contemporary and future philosophy? Which
are the lessons to learn or aspects to consider? Let me put forth the following points for
discussion. Some are more general, some especially important for mathematical philosophers.
(1) Philosophers who think that following Carnap and being suspicious about
normative/substantial ethics and/or cognitivism is the only option for staying close
to the Vienna Circle’s tradition are mistaken. Even some core members supported
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a wider range of options. Needless to say, even more options were considered than
I could present today.
(2) Shared background assumptions unite. In the Vienna Circle, these shared
background assumptions did not primarily concern the conceptions of ethics or the
use of formal methods, but rather morality itself. Scientific humanism was the
common frame of reference. As a general frame, it is open to specific
interpretations and supplements. However, we should keep in mind that it is
exactly this shared scientific humanism that determines in some respects which
philosophical approaches in the inquiry of morality could be considered adequate.
A metaethical approach looking for good arguments of why a divine will
determines morality was out of question. It would have not made sense within the
frame of scientific humanism. Perhaps scientific humanisms is open to taking a
divine will into consideration when it comes to motivation. Apart from this general
exclusion of options, additional premises led to specific metaethical positions like
an individualistic non-cognitivism.
I deem it important for mathematical philosophers to learn that
methodological viewpoints were not constitutive in this respect. It was not the
method but the account of what morality is about that united the circle in the first
place.
(3) A philosopher who engages in ethics cannot dismiss his or her conception of
morality entirely as soon as it comes to questions of adequacy. The concentration
on logic or other formal methods might not provide an escape. For mathematical
philosophers, this means that in many cases, deciding on a method means at the
same time deciding on a fundamental assumption about what morality is about or
how moral language works. Take the translation of moral statements into pure
optatives as an example. Frankly, I consider those mathematical philosophers good
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ones who not only know about the strength of their methods, but also about their
limits and the respective background assumptions. Methods are like fishing nets:
they have a determining influence on which fish you will catch. In general, you
have to be a very good mathematical philosopher to be able to distinguish useful
application from useless. To be sure, this is true for an applicant of any method.
(4) I presume that the ethical contributions of the Vienna Circle would have been
improved by a discussion of ethical issues in the meetings of the circle and to a
certain extent by the application of formal methods, too. Perhaps one of you young
mathematical philosophers will come up with such improved theories.
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